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Blind Fingerprinting
Ying Wang and Pierre Moulin
Abstract
We study blind fingerprinting, where the host sequence into which fingerprints are embedded is
partially or completely unknown to the decoder. This problem relates to a multiuser version of the
Gel’fand-Pinsker problem. The number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown, and the
colluders and the fingerprint embedder are subject to distortion constraints.
We propose a conditionally constant-composition random binning scheme and a universal decoding
rule and derive the corresponding false-positive and false-negative error exponents. The encoder is a
stacked binning scheme and makes use of an auxiliary random sequence. The decoder is a maximum
doubly-penalized mutual information decoder, where the significance of each candidate coalition is
assessed relative to a threshold that trades off false-positive and false-negative error exponents. The
penalty is proportional to coalition size and is a function of the conditional type of host sequence.
Positive exponents are obtained at all rates below a certain value, which is therefore a lower bound on
public fingerprinting capacity. We conjecture that this value is the public fingerprinting capacity. A simpler
threshold decoder is also given, which has similar universality properties but also lower achievable rates.
An upper bound on public fingerprinting capacity is also derived.
Index Terms. Fingerprinting, traitor tracing, watermarking, data hiding, randomized codes, universal
codes, method of types, maximum mutual information decoder, minimum equivocation decoder, channel
coding with side information, random binning, capacity, error exponents, multiple access channels, model
order selection.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Content fingerprinting finds applications to document protection for multimedia distribution, broad-
casting, and traitor tracing [1]–[4]. A covertext—image, video, audio, or text—is to be distributed to
many users. A fingerprint, a mark unique to each user, is embedded into each copy of the covertext. In
a collusion attack, several users may combine their copies in an attempt to “remove” their fingerprints
and to forge a pirated copy. The distortion between the pirated copy and the colluding copies is bounded
by a certain tolerance level. To trace the forgery back to the coalition members, we need fingerprinting
codes that can reliably identify the fingerprints of those members. Essentially, from a communication
viewpoint, the fingerprinting problem is a multiuser version of the watermarking problem [5]–[10]. For
watermarking, the attack is by one user and is based on one single copy, whereas for fingerprinting, the
attack is modeled as a multiple-access channel (MAC). The covertext plays the role of side information
to the encoder and possibly to the decoder.
Depending on the availability of the original covertext to the decoder, there are two basic versions
of the problem: private and public. In the private fingerprinting setup, the covertext is available to both
the encoder and decoder. In the public fingerprinting setup, the covertext is available to the encoder but
not to the decoder, and thus decoding performance is generally worse. However public fingerprinting
presents an important advantage over private fingerprinting, in that it does not require the vast storage
and computational resources that are needed for media registration in a large database. For example, a
DVD player could detect fingerprints from a movie disc and refuse to play it if fingerprints other than
the owner’s are present. Or Web crawling programs can be used to automatically search for unauthorized
content on the Internet or other public networks [3].
The scenario considered in this paper is one where a degraded version Sd of each host symbol S is
available to the decoder. Private and public fingerprinting are obtained as special cases with Sd = S
and Sd = ∅, respectively. We refer to this scenario as either blind or semiprivate fingerprinting. The
motivation is analogous to semiprivate watermarking [11], where some information about the host signal
is provided to the receiver in order to improve decoding performance. This may be necessary to guarantee
an acceptable performance level when the number of colluders is large.
The capacity and reliability limits of private fingerprinting have been studied in [7]–[10]. The decoder
of [10] is a variation of Liu and Hughes’ minimum equivocation decoder [12], accounting for the presence
of side information and for the fact that the number of channel inputs is unknown. Two basic types of
decoders are of interest: detect-all and detect-one. The detect-all decoder aims to catch all members of
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3the coalition and an error occurs if some colluder escapes detection. The detect-one decoder is content
with catching at least one of the culprits and an error occurs only when none of the colluders is identified.
A third type of error (arguably the most damaging one) is a false positive, by which the decoder accuses
an innocent user.
In the same way as fingerprinting is related to the MAC problem, blind fingerprinting is related to
a multiuser extension of the Gel’fand-Pinsker problem. The capacity region for the latter problem is
unknown. An inner region, achievable using random binning, was given in [13].
This paper derives random-coding exponents and an upper bound on detect-all capacity for semiprivate
fingerprinting. Neither the encoder nor the decoder know the number of colluders. The collusion channel
has arbitrary memory but is subject to a distortion constraint between the pirated copy and the colluding
copies. Our fingerprinting scheme uses random binning because, unlike in the private setup, the availability
of side information to the encoder and decoder is asymmetric. To optimize the error exponents, we propose
an extension of the stacked-binning scheme that was developed for single-user channel coding with side
information [11]. Here the codebook consists of a stack of variable-size codeword-arrays indexed by the
conditional type of the covertext sequence. The decoder is a minimum doubly-penalized equivocation
(M2PE) decoder or equivalently, a maximum doubly-penalized mutual information (M2PMI) decoder.
The proposed fingerprinting system is universal in that it can cope with unknown collusion channels
and unknown number of colluders, as in the private fingerprinting setup of [10]. A tunable parameter ∆
trades off false-positive and false-negative error exponents. The derivation of these exponents combines
techniques from [10] and [11]. A preliminary version of our work, assuming a fixed number of colluders,
was given in [14], [15].
A. Organization of This Paper
A mathematical statement of our generic fingerprinting problem is given in Sec. II, together with the
basic definitions of error probabilities, capacity, error exponents, and fair coalitions. Sec. III presents
our random coding scheme. Sec. IV presents a simple but suboptimal decoder that compares empirical
mutual information scores between received data and individual fingerprints, and outputs a guilty decision
whenever the score exceeds a certain tunable threshold. Sec. V presents a joint decoder that assigns a
penalized empirical mutual information score to candidate coalitions and selects the coalition with the
highest score. Sec. VI establishes an upper bound on blind fingerprinting capacity under the detect-all
criterion. Finally, conclusions are given in Sec. VII. The proofs of the theorems are given in appendices.
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4B. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, calligraphic
letters for finite alphabets, and boldface letters for sequences. We denote by M⋆ the set of sequences
of arbitrary length (including 0) whose elements are in M. The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of a
random variable X ∈ X is denoted by pX = {pX(x), x ∈ X}. The entropy of a random variable X is
denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). Should the dependency on the underlying p.m.f.s be explicit, we write the
p.m.f.s as subscripts, e.g., HpX (X) and IpX ,pY |X (X;Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between two
p.m.f.s p and q is denoted by D(p||q); the conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence of pY |X and qY |X
given pX is denoted by D(pY |X ||qY |X |pX) = D(pY |X pX ||qY |X pX). All logarithms are in base 2 unless
specified otherwise.
Denote by px the type, or empirical p.m.f. induced by a sequence x ∈ XN . The type class Tx is
the set of all sequences of type px. Likewise, we denote by pxy the joint type of a pair of sequences
(x,y) ∈ XN × YN and by Txy the type class associated with pxy. The conditional type py|x of a pair
of sequences (x,y) is defined by pxy(x, y)/px(x) for all x ∈ X such that px(x) > 0. The conditional
type class Ty|x given x, is the set of all sequences y˜ such that (x, y˜) ∈ Txy. We denote by H(x) the
empirical entropy of the p.m.f. px, by H(y|x) the empirical conditional entropy, and by I(x;y) the
empirical mutual information for the joint p.m.f. pxy.
We use the calligraphic fonts PX and P [N ]X to represent the set of all p.m.f.s and all empirical p.m.f.’s,
respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, PY |X and P
[N ]
Y |X denote the set of all conditional p.m.f.s and
all empirical conditional p.m.f.’s on the alphabet Y . A special symbol WK will be used to denote the
feasible set of collusion channels pY |X1,··· ,XK that can be selected by a size-K coalition.
Mathematical expectation is denoted by the symbol E. The shorthands aN
.
= bN and aN

≤ bN denote
asymptotic relations in the exponential scale, respectively limN→∞ 1N log
aN
bN
= 0 and lim supN→∞
1
N
log aN
bN
≤ 0. We define |t|+ , max(t, 0) and exp2(t) , 2t. The indicator function of a set A is
denoted by 1{x∈A}. Finally, we adopt the convention that the minimum of a function over an empty set
is +∞ and the maximum of a function over an empty set is 0.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Overview
Our model for blind fingerprinting is diagrammed in Fig. 1. Let S , X , and Y be three finite alphabets.
The covertext sequence S = (S1, · · · , SN ) ∈ SN consists of N independent and identically distributed
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Fig. 1. Model for semiprivate (blind) fingerprinting game, where Sd is a degraded version of the covertext S. Private and
public fingerprinting arise as special cases with Sd = S and Sd = ∅, respectively.
(i.i.d.) samples drawn from a p.m.f. pS(s), s ∈ S . A random variable V taking values in an alphabet VN is
shared between encoder and decoder, and not publicly revealed. The random variable V is independent of
S and plays the role of a cryptographic key. There are 2NR users, each of which receives a fingerprinted
copy:
Xm = fN (S, V,m), 1 ≤ m ≤ 2
NR, (2.1)
where fN : SN × VN × {1, · · · , 2NR} → XN is the encoding function, and m is the index of the
user. The encoder binds each fingerprinted copy xm to the covertext s via a distortion constraint. Let
d : S × X → R+ be the distortion measure and dN (s,x) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 d(si, xi) the extension of this
measure to length-N sequences. The code fN is subject to the distortion constraint
dN (s,xm) ≤ D1 1 ≤ m ≤ 2
NR. (2.2)
Let K , {m1, m2 · · · , mK} be a coalition of K users, called colluders. No constraints are imposed
on the formation of coalitions. The colluders combine their copies XK , {Xm, m ∈ K} to produce
a pirated copy Y ∈ YN . Without loss of generality, we assume that Y is generated stochastically as
the output of a collusion channel pY|XK . Fidelity constraints are imposed on pY|XK to ensure that Y
is “close” to the fingerprinted copies Xm, m ∈ K. These constraints can take the form of distortion
constraints, analogously to (2.2). They are formulated below and result in the definition of a feasible
class WK of attacks.
The decoder knows neither K nor pY|XK selected by the K colluders and has access to the pirated copy
Y, the secret key V , as well as to Sd, a degraded version of the host S. To simplify the exposition, the
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6degradation arises via a deterministic symbolwise mapping h : S → Sd. The sequence sd = h(s) could
represent a coarse version of s, or some other features of s. Two special cases are private fingerprinting
where Sd = S, and public fingerprinting where Sd = ∅. The decoder produces an estimate
Kˆ = gN (Y,S
d, V ) (2.3)
of the coalition. A possible decision is the empty set, Kˆ = ∅, which is the reasonable choice when an
accusation would be unreliable. To summarize, we have
Definition 2.1: A randomized rate-R length-N fingerprinting code (fN , gN ) with embedding distortion
D1 is a pair of encoder mapping fN : SN × VN × {1, 2, · · · , 2NR} → XN and decoder mapping
gN : Y
N × (Sd)N × VN → {1, 2, · · · , 2
NR}⋆.
The randomization is via the secret key V and can take the form of permutations of the symbol
positions {1, 2, · · · , N}, permutations of the 2NR fingerprint assignments, and an auxiliary time-sharing
sequence, as in [6]— [10], [16].
We now state the attack models and define the error probabilities, capacities, and error exponents.
B. Collusion Channels
The conditional type py|xK is a random variable whose conditional distribution given xK depends on
the collusion channel pY|XK . Our fidelity constraint on the coalition is of the general form
Pr[py|xK ∈ WK ] = 1, (2.4)
where WK is a convex subset of PY |XK . That is, the empirical conditional p.m.f. of the pirated copy given
the marked copies is restricted. Examples of WK are given in [10], including hard distortion constraints
on the coalition:
WK =
{
pY |XK :
∑
xK,y
pXK(xK) pY |XK(y|xK)Eφ d2(φ(xK), y) ≤ D2
}
(2.5)
where φ : XK → S is a (possible randomized) permutation-invariant estimator Sˆ = φ(XK) of each host
signal sample based on the corresponding marked samples; d2 : S → Y is the coalition’s distortion
function; pXK is a reference p.m.f.; and D2 is the maximum allowed distortion. Another possible choice
for WK is obtained using the Boneh-Shaw constraint [1], [10].
Fair Coalitions. Denote by π a permutation of the elements of K. The set of fair, feasible collusion
channels is the subset of WK consisting of permutation-invariant channels:
W
fair
K =
{
pY |XK ∈ WK : pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀π
}
. (2.6)
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7The collusion channel pY|XK is said to be fair if Pr[py|xK ∈ W
fair
K ] = 1. For any fair collusion channel,
the conditional type py|xK is invariant to permutations of the colluders.
Strongly exchangeable collusion channels [7]. Now denote by π a permutation of the samples of a
length-N sequence. For strongly exchangeable channels, pY|XK(πy|πxK) is independent of π, for every
(xK,y). The channel is defined by a probability assignment Pr[Ty|xK ] on the conditional type classes.
The distribution of Y conditioned on Y ∈ Ty|xK is uniform:
pY|XK(y˜|xK) =
Pr[Ty|xK]
|Ty|xK |
, ∀y˜ ∈ Ty|xK . (2.7)
C. Error Probabilities
Let K be the actual coalition and Kˆ = gN (Y,Sd, V ) the decoder’s output. The three error probabilities
of interest in this paper are the probability of false positives (one or more innocent users are accused),
PFP (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[Kˆ \ K 6= ∅],
the probability of failing to catch a single colluder,
P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[Kˆ ∩ K = ∅],
and the probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
P alle (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[K 6⊆ Kˆ].
These three probabilities are obtained by averaging over S, V , and the output of the collusion channel
pY|XK . In each case the worst-case probability is denoted by
Pe(fN , gN ,WK) = max
pY|XK
Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK) (2.8)
where Pe denotes either PFP , P onee or P alle , and the maximum is over all feasible collusion channels,
i.e., such that (2.4) holds.
D. Capacity and Random-Coding Exponents
Definition 2.2: A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D1, collusion class WK , and detect-one
criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2NR⌉) randomized codes (fN , gN ) with maximum embedding
distortion D1, such that both P onee,N (fN , gN ,WK) and PFP,N (fN , gN ,WK) vanish as N →∞.
Definition 2.3: A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D1, collusion class WK , and detect-all
criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2NR⌉) randomized codes (fN , gN ) with maximum embedding
distortion D1, such that both P alle,N (fN , gN ,WK) and PFP,N (fN , gN ,WK) vanish as N →∞.
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8Definition 2.4: Fingerprinting capacities Cone(D1,WK) and Call(D1,WK) are the suprema of all
achievable rates with respect to the detect-one and detect-all criteria, respectively.
For random codes the error exponents corresponding to (2.8) are defined as
E{one,all,FP}(R,D1,WK) = lim inf
N→∞
[
−
1
N
logP {one,all,FP}e (fN , gN ,WK)
]
. (2.9)
We have Call(D1,WK) ≤ Cone(D1,WK) and Eall(R,D1,WK) ≤ Eone(R,D1,WK) because an error
event for the detect-one problem is also an error event for the detect-all problem.
III. OVERVIEW OF RANDOM-CODING SCHEME
A brief overview of our scheme is given in this section. The decoders will be specified later. The
scheme is designed to achieve a false-positive error exponent equal to ∆ and assumes a nominal value
Knom for coalition size. Two arbitrarily large integers Lw and Lu are selected, defining alphabets
W = {1, 2, · · · , Lw} and U = {1, 2, · · · , Lu}, respectively. The parameters ∆,Knom, Lw, Lu are used to
identify a certain optimal type class T ∗w and conditional type classes T ∗U |SdW (s
d,w), T ∗
U |SW (s,w) and
T ∗
X|USW (u, s,w) for every possible (u, s,w). Optimality is defined relative to either the thresholding
decoder of Sec. IV or the joint decoder of Sec. V. The secret key V consists of a random sequence
W ∈ Tw∗ and the collection (3.1) of random codebooks indexed by sd,w, λ.
A. Codebook
A random constant-composition code
C(sd,w, λ) = {u(l,m, λ), 1 ≤ l ≤ 2Nρ(λ), 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR} (3.1)
is generated for each pair of sequences (sd,w) ∈ (Sd)N × T ∗w and conditional type λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW by
drawing 2N [R+ρ(λ)] random sequences independently and uniformly from an optimized conditional type
class T ∗
U |SdW (s
d,w), and arranging them into an array with 2NR columns and 2Nρ(λ) rows. Similarly to
[11] (see Fig. 2 therein), we refer to ρ(λ) as the depth parameter of the array.
B. Encoding Scheme
Prior to encoding, a sequence W ∈ WN is drawn independently of S and uniformly from T ∗w, and
shared with the receiver. Given (S,W), the encoder determines the conditional type λ = ps|sdw and
performs the following two steps for each user 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR.
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91) Find l such that u(l,m, λ) ∈ C(sd,w, λ)⋂ T ∗
U |SW (s,w). If more than one such l exists, pick one
of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let u = u(l,m, λ). If no such l can be found,
generate u uniformly from the conditional type class T ∗
U |SW (s,w).
2) Generate Xm uniformly distributed over the conditional type class T ∗X|USW (u, s,w), and assign
this marked sequence to user m.
C. Worst Collusion Channel
The fingerprinting codes used in this paper are randomly-modulated (RM) codes [10, Def. 2.2]. For
such codes we have the following proposition, which is a straightforward variation of [10, Prop. 2.1]
with Sd in place of S at the decoder.
Proposition 3.1: For any RM code (fN , gN ), the maximum of the error probability criteria (2.8) over
all feasible pY|XK is achieved by a strongly exchangeable collusion channel, as defined in (2.7).
To derive error exponents for such channels, it suffices to use the following upper bound:
pY|XK(y˜|xK) =
Pr[Ty|xK]
|Ty|xK |
≤
1
|Ty|xK |
1{py|xK∈WK}
, ∀ y˜ ∈ Ty|xK (3.2)
which holds uniformly over all feasible probability assignments to conditional type classes Ty|xK .
D. Encoding and Decoding Errors
The array depth parameter ρ(λ) takes the form
ρ(λ) = I(u; s|sd,w) + ǫ
where u is any element of T ∗
U |SW (s,w), and ǫ > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. The analysis shows
that given any (s,w), the probability of encoding errors vanishes doubly exponentially.
The analysis also shows that the decoding error probability is dominated by a single joint type class
Tyusw. Denote by (y,u, s,w) an arbitrary representative of that class. The normalized logarithm of the
size of the array is given by
R+ ρ(λ) = I(u;y|sd,w)−∆,
and the probability of false positives vanishes as 2−N∆.
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IV. THRESHOLD DECODER
A. Decoding
The decoder has access to (y, sd,w) but does not know the conditional type λ = ps|sdw realized at the
encoder. The decoder evaluates the users one at a time and makes an innocent/guilty decision on each
user independently of the other users. Specifically, the receiver outputs an estimated coalition Kˆ if and
only if Kˆ satisfies the following condition:
∀m ∈ Kˆ : max
λ∈P[N ]
S|SdW
max
1≤l≤2Nρ(λ)
I(u(l,m, λ);y|sdw)− ρ(λ) > R+∆. (4.1)
If no such Kˆ is found, the receiver outputs Kˆ = ∅. This decoder outputs all user indices whose empirical
mutual information score, penalized by ρ(λ), exceeds the threshold R+∆.
Observe that the maximizing λ in (4.1) may depend on m. With high probability, this event implies a
decoding error. Improvements can only be obtained using a more complex joint decoder, as in Sec. V.
B. Error Exponents
Define the following set of conditional p.m.f.’s for (XU)K , (XK, UK) given (S,W ):
M(pXU |SW ) = {p(XU)K|SW : pXmUm|SW = pXU |SW , m ∈ K},
i.e., the conditional marginal p.m.f. pXU |SW is the same for each (Xm, Um),∀m ∈ K. Also define the
sets
PXU |SW (pSW , Lw, Lu,D1) =
{
pXU |SW : E[d(S,X)] ≤ D1
}
,
P(XU)KW |S(pS , Lw, Lu,D1) =
{
p(XU)KW |S = pW
∏
k∈K
pXkUk|SW
: pX1U1|SW = · · · = pXKUK |SW , and E[d(S,X1)] ≤ D1
}(4.2)
where in (4.2) the random variables (Xk, Uk), k ∈ K, are conditionally i.i.d. given (S,W ).
Define for each m ∈ K the set of conditional p.m.f.’s
PY (XU)K|SW (pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK , R, Lw, Lu,m)
,
{
p˜Y (XU)K|SW : p˜(XU)K|SW ∈ M(pXU |SW ), p˜Y |XK ∈ WK ,
IpW p˜S|W p˜Y (XU)K|SW (Um;Y |S
dW )− IpW p˜S|W pXU|SW (U ;S|S
dW ) ≤ R
}
(4.3)
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and the pseudo sphere packing exponent
E˜psp,m(R, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = min
p˜Y (XU)K|SW∈PY (XU)K|SW (pW ,p˜S|W ,pXU|SW ,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,m)
D(p˜Y (XU)K|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK p
K
XU |SW pS |pW ). (4.4)
Taking the maximum and minimum of E˜psp,m above over m ∈ K, we respectively define
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = max
m∈K
E˜psp,m(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK),(4.5)
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = min
m∈K
E˜psp,m(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK).(4.6)
For a fair coalition (WK = W fairK ), E˜psp,m is independent of m ∈ K, and the two expressions above
coincide. Define
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = max
pW∈PW
min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
max
pXU|SW∈PXU|SW (pW p˜S|W ,Lw,Lu,D1)
E˜psp,1(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,W
fair
K ). (4.7)
Denote by p∗W and p∗XU |SW the maximizers in (4.7), the latter to be viewed as a function of p˜S|W . Both
p∗W and p∗XU |SW implicitly depend on R and W
fair
K . Finally, define
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
XU |SW ,WK) (4.8)
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
XU |SW ,WK). (4.9)
The terminology pseudo sphere-packing exponent is used because despite its superficial similarity to
a real sphere-packing exponent, (4.4) does not provide a fundamental asymptotic lower bound on error
probability.
Theorem 4.1: The decision rule (4.1) yields the following error exponents.
(i) The false-positive error exponent is
EFP (R,D1,WK ,∆) = ∆. (4.10)
(ii) The detect-all error exponent is
Eall(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK). (4.11)
(iii) The detect-one error exponent is
Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R +∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK). (4.12)
(iv) A fair collusion strategy is optimal under the detect-one error criterion:
Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = E
one(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
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(v) The detect-one and detect-all error exponents are the same when the colluders emply a fair
strategy: Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W fairK ,∆) = E
all(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
(vi) For K = Knom, the supremum of all rates for which the detect-one error exponent of (4.12) is
positive is
Cthr(D1,WK) = C
thr(D1,W
fair
K )
= lim
Lw,Lu→∞
max
pW∈PW
max
pXU|SW∈PXU|SW (pW pS ,Lw,Lu,D1)
min
pY |XK∈W
fair
K
[I(U ;Y |Sd,W )− I(U ;S|Sd,W )]. (4.13)
V. JOINT FINGERPRINT DECODER
The fundamental improvement over the simple thresholding strategy for decoding in Sec. IV resides
in the use of a joint decoding rule. Specifically, the decoder maximizes a penalized empirical mutual
information score over all possible coalitions of any size. The penalty depends on the conditional host
sequence type ps|sdw, as in Sec. IV, and is proportional to the size of the coalition, as in [10, Sec. V]. We
call this blind fingerprint decoder the maximum doubly-penalized mutual information (M2PMI) decoder.
Mutual Information of k Random Variables. The mutual information of k random variables X1, · · · ,Xk
is defined as the sum of their individual entropies minus their joint entropy [21, p. 57] or equivalently,
the divergence between their joint distribution and the product of their marginals:
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk) = H(X1) + · · · +H(Xk)−H(X1, · · · ,Xk) (5.1)
= D(pX1···Xk‖pX1 · · · pXk).
The symbol
◦
I is used to distinguish it from ordinary mutual information I between two random vari-
ables. Similarly one can define a conditional mutual information
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk|Z) =
∑
iH(Xi|Z) −
H(X1, · · · ,Xk|Z) conditioned on Z , and an empirical mutual information
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk|z) between k
sequences x1, · · · ,xk, conditioned on z, as the conditional mutual information with respect to the joint
type of x1, · · · ,xk, z. Some properties of
◦
I are given in [10, Sec. V.A].
Recall that xA denotes {xm, m ∈ A} and that the codewords in (3.1) take the form u(l,m, λ). In the
following, we shall use the compact notation (xu)A , (xA,uA), and
u(lA,mA, λ) , {u(lm1 ,m1, λ), · · · ,u(lm|A| ,m|A|, λ)} for A = {m1, · · · ,m|A|}.
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A. M2PMI Criterion
Given y, sd,w, the decoder seeks the coalition size k, the conditional host sequence type λ ∈ P [N ]
S|SdW ,
and the codewords u(l,m, λ) in C(sd,w, λ) that maximize the M2PMI criterion below. The column
indices m ∈ K, corresponding to the decoded words form the decoded coalition Kˆ. If the maximizing k
in (5.2) is zero, the receiver outputs Kˆ = ∅.
The Maximum Doubly-Penalized Mutual Information criterion is defined as
max
k≥0
M2PMI(k) (5.2)
where
M2PMI(k) =


0 : if k = 0
max
λ∈P
[N ]
S|SdW
max
uK∈Ck(sd,w,λ)
[
◦
I(uK;y|s
dw)− k(ρ(λ) +R+∆)
]
: if k = 1, 2, · · ·
(5.3)
B. Properties
The following lemma shows that 1) each subset of the estimated coalition is significant, and 2) any
further extension of the coalition would fail a significance test. The proof parallels that of Lemma 5.1
in [10] and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 5.1: Let Kˆ, λ, lKˆ achieve the maximum in (5.3) (5.2), i.e., uKˆ = u(lKˆ,mKˆ, λ). Then for each
subset of the estimated coalition Kˆ, we have
∀A ⊆ Kˆ :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ\A,mKˆ\A, λ) |s
dw) > |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆). (5.4)
Moreover, for every A disjoint with Kˆ,
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ,mKˆ, λ) |s
dw) ≤ |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆). (5.5)
C. Error Exponents
Define for each A ⊆ K the set of conditional p.m.f.’s
PY (XU)K|SW (pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK , R, Lw, Lu,A)
,
{
p˜Y (XU)K|SW : p˜(XU)K|SW ∈ M(pXU |SW ),
1
|A|
◦
IpW p˜S|W p˜Y (XU)K|SW (UA;Y UK\A|S
d,W ) ≤ IpW p˜S|W pXU|SW (U ;S|S
d,W ) +R
}
(5.6)
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and the pseudo sphere packing exponent
E˜psp,A(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = min
p˜Y (XU)K|SW∈PY (XU)K|SW (pW ,p˜S|W ,pXU|SW ,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,A)
D(p˜Y (XU)K|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK p˜(XU)K|SW pS |pW ).(5.7)
Taking the maximum 1 and the minimum of E˜psp,A above over all subsets A of K, we define
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = E˜psp,K(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK), (5.8)
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) = min
A⊆K
E˜psp,A(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK).(5.9)
Now define
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = max
pW∈PW
min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
max
pXU|SW∈PXU|SW (pW ,p˜S|W ,Lw,Lu,D1)
E˜psp,K(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,W
fair
Knom
). (5.10)
Denote by p∗W and p∗XU |SW the maximizers in (5.10), where the latter is to be viewed as a function of
p˜S|W . Both p∗W and p∗XU |SW implicitly depend on R and W
fair
K . Finally, define
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
XU |SW ,WK), (5.11)
Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
XU |SW ,WK). (5.12)
Theorem 5.2: The decision rule (5.2) yields the following error exponents.
(i) The false-positive error exponent is
EFP (R,D1,WK ,∆) = ∆. (5.13)
(ii) The detect-all error exponent is
Eall(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK). (5.14)
(iii) The detect-one error exponent is
Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R +∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK). (5.15)
(iv) Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK ,∆) = Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W fairK ,∆).
(v) Eall(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W fairK ,∆) = Eone(R,Lw, Lu,D1,W fairK ,∆).
1 The property that K achieves maxA⊆K E˜psp,A is established in the proof of Theorem 5.2, Part (iv).
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(vi) If K = Knom, the supremum of all rates for which the error exponent of (5.15) and (5.14) are
positive is
Cone(D1,WK) = C
one(D1,W
fair
K )
= lim
Lw,Lu→∞
max
pW∈PW
max
p(XU)K|SW∈P(XU)K|SW (pW ,pS,Lw,Lu,D1)
min
pY |XK∈W
fair
K[
1
K
I(UK;Y |S
d,W )− I(U ;S|Sd,W )
]
(5.16)
under the “detect-one” criterion, and by
Call(D1,WK) = lim
Lw ,Lu→∞
max
pW∈PW
max
p(XU)K|SW∈P(XU)K|SW (pW ,pS,Lw,Lu,D1)
min
pY |XK∈WK[
min
A⊆K
1
|A|
I(UA;Y |S
d,W,UK\A)− I(U ;S|S
d,W )
]
(5.17)
under the “detect-all” criterion. If the colluders select a fair collusion channel, as is their
collective interest, the minimization is restricted to W fairK in (5.17), and then
Call(D1,WK) = C
one(D1,WK).
For the special case of private fingerprinting (Sd = S), the term I(U ;S|Sd,W ) in (5.16) is zero.
Since I(UK;Y |S,W ) ≤ I((XU)K;Y |S,W ), it suffices to choose Lu = |X | and U = X to achieve the
maximum in (5.16). The resulting expression coincides with the capacity formula in [10, Theorem 3.2].
Similarly to the single-user case [11], when U = X the binning scheme is degenerate.
D. Bounded Coalition Size
Assume now that K is known not exceed some maximum value Kmax. The same random coding
scheme can be used. In the evaluation of the M2PMI criterion of (5.2), the maximization is now limited
to 0 ≤ k ≤ Kmax. In Lemma 5.1, property (5.4) holds, and property (5.5) now holds for every A disjoint
with Kˆ, and of size |A| ≤ Kmax − |Kˆ|. Following the derivation of the error exponents in the appendix,
we see that these exponents remain the same as those given by Theorem 5.2.
Blind watermarking. The case Kmax = 1 represents blind watermark decoding with a guarantee that
the false-positive exponent is at least equal to ∆. In this scenario, there is no need for a time-sharing
sequence w, and the decoder’s input y is either an unwatermarked sequence (K = 0) or a watermarked
sequence (K = 1). The M2PMI criterion of (5.3) reduces to
M2PMI(k) = max
λ
max
u∈C(sd)
I(u;y|sd)− (ρ(λ) +R+∆) for k = 1.
The resulting false-positive and false-negative exponents are given by ∆ and Epsp(R+∆, 0, Lu,D1,WK),
respectively.
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VI. UPPER BOUNDS ON PUBLIC FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY
Deriving public fingerprinting capacity is a challenge because the capacity region for the Gel’fand-
Pinsker version of the MAC is still unknown, in fact an outer bound for this region has yet to be
established. Even in the case of a MAC with side information causally available at the transmitter but
not at the receiver, the expressions for the inner and outer capacity regions do not coincide [23]. Likewise,
the expression derived below is an upper bound on public fingerprinting capacity under the detect-all
criterion.
Recall the definition of the set P(XU)KW |S(pS, Lw, Lu,D1) in (4.2), where W and U are random
variables defined over alphabets W = {1, 2, · · · , Lw} and U = {1, 2, · · · , Lu}, respectively. Here we
define the larger set
P
outer
(XU)KW |S
(pS , Lw, Lu,D1) =
{
p(XU)KW |S = pW
(∏
k∈K
pXk|SW
)
pUK|XKSW :
pX1|SW = · · · = pXK |SW , and E[d(S,X1)] ≤ D1
} (6.1)
where Xk, k ∈ K, are still conditionally i.i.d. given (S,W ) but the random variables Uk, k ∈ K, are
generally conditionally dependent.
Define
C
all
Lw,Lu(D1,WK) = max
p(XU)KW |S∈P
outer
(XU)KW |S
(pS ,Lw,Lu,D1)
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
|A|
[
I(UA;Y, S
d|UK\A)− I(UA;S|UK\A)
]
. (6.2)
Using the same derivation as in Lemma 2.1 of [11], it can be shown that CallLw,Lu(D1,WK) is a nonde-
creasing function of Lw and Lu and converges to a finite limit. Moreover, the gap to the limit may be
bounded by a polynomial function of Lw and Lu, see [11, Sec. 3.5] for a similar derivation.
Theorem 6.1: Public fingerprinting capacity is upper-bounded by
C
all
(D1,WK) = lim
Lw ,Lu→∞
C
all
Lw ,Lu
(D1,WK) (6.3)
under the “detect-all” criterion.
Proof: see appendix.
We conjecture that the upper bound on capacity given by Theorem 6.1 is generally not tight. The
insight here is that the upper bound remains valid if the class of encoding functions is enlarged to
include feedback from the receiver: Xki = f˜i(S,Mk, Y i−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . It can indeed be verified
that all the inequalities in the proof and the Markov chain properties hold. The question is now whether
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feedback can increase public fingerprinting capacity. We conjecture the answer is yes, because feedback
is known to increase MAC capacity [24].
We also make the stronger conjecture that the maximum over p(XU)K|SW is achieved by a p.m.f. that
decouples the components (Xk, Uk), k ∈ K, conditioned on (S,W ). If this is true, the set Pouter(XU)KW |S(pS ,
Lw, Lu,D1) in the formula (6.2) can be replaced with the smaller set P(XU)KW |S(pS , Lw, Lu,D1) of
(4.2), and the random coding scheme of Sec. V is capacity-achieving.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a communication model and a random-coding scheme for blind fingerprinting. While
a standard binning scheme for communication with asymmetric side information at the transmitter and
the receiver may seem like a reasonable candidate, such a scheme would be unable to trade false-positive
error exponents against false-negative error exponents. Our proposed binning scheme combines two ideas.
The first is the use of a stacked binning scheme as in [11], which demonstrated the advantages (in terms
of decoding error exponents) of selecting codewords from an array whose size depends on the conditional
type of the host sequence. The second is the use of an auxiliary time-sharing random variable as in [10].
The blind fingerprint decoders of Secs. IV and V combine the advantages of both methods and provide
positive error exponents for a range of code rates. The tradeoff between the two fundamental types of
error probabilities is determined by the value of the parameter ∆.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We derive the error exponents for the thresholding rule (4.1). We have W = {1, 2, · · · , Lw} and
U = {1, 2, · · · , Lu}. Fix some arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. Define for all m ∈ K
P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK , R, Lw, Lu,m) =
{
py(xu)K|sw : p(xu)K|sw ∈ M(pxu|sw),
py|xK ∈ WK , I(um;y|s
dw) ≤ ρ(ps|sdw) +R
}
E˘psp,m,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = min
py(xu)K|sw∈P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw,ps|w,pxu|sw,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,m)
D(py(xu)K|sw‖py|xK p
K
xu|sw|psw), (A.1)
Eˆpsp,m,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = D(ps|w‖pS | pw) + E˘psp,m,N(R,Lw, Lu,
pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK)
= min
py(xu)K|sw∈P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw,ps|w,pxu|sw,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,m)
D(py(xu)K|sw ps|w‖py|xK p
K
xu|sw pS |pw),(A.2)
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = max
m∈K
Eˆpsp,m,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK)
(A.3)
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = min
m∈K
Eˆpsp,m,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK)
(A.4)
where (A.2) is obtained by application of the chain rule for divergence. Also define
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = max
pw∈P
[N ]
W
min
ps|w∈P
[N ]
S|W
max
pxu|sw∈P
[N ]
XU|SW
(pw ps|w,Lw,Lu,D1)
Eˆpsp,1,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,W
fair
Knom
). (A.5)
Denote by p∗w and p∗xu|sw the maximizers above, the latter viewed as a function of ps|w. Both maximizers
depend implicitly on R and W fairKnom . Let
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
ps|w∈P
[N ]
S|W
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw), (A.6)
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
ps|w∈P
[N ]
S|W
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw). (A.7)
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The exponents (A.2)—(A.7) differ from (4.4)—(4.9) in that the optimizations are performed over condi-
tional types instead of general conditional p.m.f.’s. We have
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) (A.8)
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) (A.9)
by continuity of the divergence and mutual-information functionals.
Consider the maximization over the conditional type pxu|sw in (A.5). As a result of this maximization,
we may associate the following:
• to any (s,w), a conditional type class T ∗
U |SW (s,w) , T
∗
u|sw;
• to any (sd,w), a conditional type class T ∗
U |SdW (s
d,w) , T ∗
u|sdw;
• to any (s,w) and u ∈ T ∗
U |SW (sw), a conditional type class T
∗
X|USW (u, s,w) , T
∗
x|usw;
• to any type psw, a conditional mutual information I∗US|SdW (psw) , I(u; s|s
d,w) where u, s,w are
any three sequences with joint type p∗
u|swpsw.
Codebook. Define the function
ρ(ps|sdw) = I
∗
US|SdW (psw) + ǫ, ∀psw ∈ P
[N ]
SW .
A random constant-composition code
C(sd,w, ps|sdw) = {u(l,m, ps|sdw), 1 ≤ l ≤ exp2{Nρ(ps|sdw), 1 ≤ m ≤ 2
NR}
is generated for each sd ∈ (Sd)N , w ∈ T ∗w, and ps|sdw ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW by drawing exp2{N(R+ ρ(ps|sdw))}
random sequences independently and uniformly from the conditional type class T ∗
U |SdW (s
d,w), and
arranging them into an array with 2NR columns and exp2{Nρ(ps|sdw)} rows.
Encoder. Prior to encoding, a sequence W ∈ WN is drawn independently of S and uniformly from
T ∗w, and shared with the receiver. Given (S,W), the encoder determines the conditional type ps|sdw and
performs the following two steps for each user 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR.
1) Find l such that u(l,m, ps|sdw) ∈ C(Sd,W, ps|sdw)
⋂
T ∗
U |SW (s,w). If more than one such l exists,
pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let u = u(l,m, ps|sdw). If no such l can
be found, generate u uniformly from the conditional type class T ∗
U |SW (s,w).
2) Generate Xm uniformly distributed over the conditional type class T ∗X|USW (u, s,w).
Collusion channel. By Prop. 3.1, it is sufficient to restrict our attention to strongly exchangeable
collusion channels in the error probability analysis.
Decoder. Given (y, sd,w), the decoder outputs Kˆ if and only if (4.1) is satisfied.
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Encoding errors. Analogously to [11], the probability of encoding errors vanishes doubly exponentially
with N because ρ(ps|sdw) > I(u; s|sdw). Indeed an encoding error for user m arises under the following
event:
Em = {(C, s,w) : (u(l,m, ps|sdw) ∈ C and u(l,m, ps|sdw) /∈ T
∗
U |SW (s,w)) for 1 ≤ l ≤ 2
Nρ(ps|sdw)}.
(A.10)
The probability that a sequence U uniformly distributed over T ∗
U |SdW (s
d,w) also belongs to T ∗
U |SW (s,w)
is equal to exp2{−NI∗US|SdW (psw)} on the exponential scale. Therefore the encoding error probability,
conditioned on type class Tsw, satisfies
Pr[Em|(S,W) ∈ Tsw] =
(
1−
|T ∗
U |SW (S,W)|
|T ∗
U |SdW (S
d,W)|
)2Nρ(ps|sdw)
.
= (1− 2
−NI∗
US|SdW
(psw))2
Nρ(p
s|sdw
)
≤ exp{− exp2(N [ρ(ps|sdw)− I
∗
US|SdW (psw)])}
= exp{−2Nǫ} (A.11)
where the inequality follows from 1− a ≤ e−a.
The derivation of the decoding error exponents is based on the following two asymptotic equalities
which are special cases of (C.2) and (C.5) established in Lemma 3.1.
1) Fix y, sd,w and draw u uniformly from some fixed type class, independently of (y, sd,w). Then
Pr[I(u;y|sdw) ≥ ν]
.
= 2−Nν . (A.12)
2) Given s,w, draw (xk,uk), k ∈ K, i.i.d. uniformly from a conditional type class Txu|sw, and then
draw y uniformly over a single conditional type class Ty|xK . For any ν > 0, we have
Pr[I(um;y|s
dw) ≤ ρ(ps|sdw) + ν]
.
= exp2{−NE˘psp,m,N(ν, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)}. (A.13)
(i). False Positives. From (4.1), the occurrence of a false positive implies that
∃λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW , l,m /∈ K : I(u(l,m, λ);y|s
dw) > ρ(λ) +R+∆. (A.14)
By construction of the codebook, u(l,m, λ) is independent of y for m /∈ K. For any given λ, there are
at most 2Nρ(λ) possible values for l and 2NR−K possible values for m in (A.14). Hence the probability
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of false positives, conditioned on the joint type class Ty(xu)Ksw, is
PFP (Ty(xu)Ksw,WK)
≤
∑
λ
(2NR −K) 2Nρ(λ) Pr[I(u(l,m, λ);y|sdw) > ρ(λ) +R+∆]
(a)
.
=
∑
λ
2N(R+ρ(λ)) 2−N(R+∆+ρ(λ))
(b)
≤ (N + 1)|S|Lw 2−N∆
.
= 2−N∆ (A.15)
where (a) is obtained by application of (A.12) with ν = ρ(λ) + R+∆, and (b) because the number of
conditional types λ is at most (N + 1)|S|Lw .
Averaging over all type classes Ty(xu)Ksw, we obtain PFP

≤ 2−N∆, from which (4.10) follows.
(ii). Detect-One Error Criterion (Miss All Colluders). We first derive the error exponent for the event
that the decoder misses a specific colluder m ∈ K. Any coalition Kˆ that contains m fails the test (4.1),
i.e., for any such Kˆ,
∀λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW : maxl
I(u(l,m, λ);y|sdw) ≤ ρ(λ) +R+∆. (A.16)
This implies that
I(u(l,m, ps|sdw);y|s
dw) ≤ ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆ (A.17)
where l is the row index actually selected by the encoder, and ps|sdw is the actual host sequence conditional
type. The probability of the miss-m event, given the joint type p∗w ps|w p∗xu|sw, is therefore upper-bounded
by the probability of the event (A.17):
pmiss−m(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK) ≤ Pr
[
I(u(l,m, ps|sdw);y|s
dw) ≤ ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆
]
(a)

≤ exp2
{
−NE˘psp,m,N(R +∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
where (a) follows from (A.13) with ν = R+∆.
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The miss-all event is the intersection of the miss-m events over m ∈ K. Its conditional probability is
pmiss−all(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
= Pr
[ ⋂
m∈K
{
miss m | p∗w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw
}]
≤ min
m∈K
pmiss−m(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
.
= exp2
{
−N max
m∈K
E˘psp,m,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
. (A.18)
Averaging over S, we obtain
pmiss−all(WK)
≤
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−all(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
.
= max
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−all(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
(a).
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−N
[
D(ps|w‖pS | p
∗
w) + max
m∈K
E˘psp,m,N(R +∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
]}
(b)
.
= exp2
{
−NEpsp,N(R +∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
(c).
= exp2
{
−NEpsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
which establishes (4.12). Here (a) follows from (C.3) and (A.18), (b) from (A.3) and (A.6), and (c) from
(A.8).
(iii). Detect-All Error Criterion (Miss Some Colluders).
The miss-some event is the union of the miss-m events overm ∈ K. Given the joint type p∗w ps|w p∗xu|sw,
the probability of this event is
pmiss−some(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK) (A.19)
= Pr
[ ⋃
m∈K
{
miss m | p∗w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw
}]
≤
∑
m∈K
pmiss−m(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
.
= max
m∈K
exp2
{
−NE˘psp,m,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
= exp2
{
−N min
m∈K
E˘psp,m,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
. (A.20)
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Averaging over S, we obtain
pmiss−some(WK)
≤
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−some(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
(a)
.
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−N
[
D(ps|w‖pS | p
∗
w) + min
m∈K
E˘psp,m,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
]}
(b)
≤ exp2
{
−NEpsp,N(R +∆,D1,WK)
}
(c)
.
= exp2
{
−NEpsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
which establishes (4.11). Here (a) follows from (C.3) and (A.20), (b) from (A.7) and (A.4), and (c) from
(A.9).
(iv). Fair Collusion Channels. The proof parallels that of [10, Theorem 4.1(iv)], using the conditional
divergence D(p˜Y (XU)K|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK pKXU |SW pS |pW ) in place of D(p˜Y XK|W‖p˜Y |XK p
K
X|W |pW ).
(v). Immediate, because Epsp = Epsp in this case.
(vi). Positive Error Exponents. From Part (v) above, we may restrict our attention to WK = W fairK .
Consider any W = {1, · · · , Lw} and pW that is positive over its support set (if it is not, reduce the value of
Lw accordingly.) For any m ∈ K, the minimand in the expression (4.4) for E˜psp,m(R,Lw, Lu, pW , pXU |SW ,
W
fair
K ) is zero if and only if
p˜Y (XU)K|SW p˜S|W = p˜Y |XK p
K
XU |SW pS, with p˜Y |XK ∈ W
fair
K .
Such (p˜Y (XU)K|SW , p˜S|W ) is feasible for (4.3) if and only if (pXU |SW , p˜Y |XK) is such that I(Um;Y |Sd,W )
≤ I(Um;S|S
d,W ) + R. It is not feasible, and thus a positive exponent Eone is guaranteed, if R <
I(U1;Y |S
d,W ) − I(U1;S|S
d,W ). The supremum of all such R is given by (4.13) and is achieved by
letting ǫ→ 0, ∆→ 0, and Lw, Lu →∞. ✷
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APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
We derive the error exponents for the M2PMI decision rule (5.2). Define for all A ⊆ K
P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK , R, Lw, Lu,A) =
{
py(xu)K|sw : p(xu)K|sw ∈ M(pxu|sw),
py|xK ∈ WK ,
◦
I(uA;yuK\A|s
dw) ≤ |A|(ρ(ps|sdw) +R)
}
(B.1)
E˘psp,A,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = min
py(xu)K|sw ∈P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw,ps|w,pxu|sw,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,A)
D(py(xu)K|sw‖py|xK p
K
xu|sw | psw), (B.2)
Eˆpsp,A,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = D(ps|w‖pS |pw) + E˘psp,A,N(R,Lw, Lu,
pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK)
= min
py(xu)K|sw ∈P
[N ]
Y (XU)K|SW
(pw,ps|w,pxu|sw,WK ,R,Lw,Lu,A)
D(py(xu)K|sw ps|w‖py|xK p
K
xu|sw pS | pw), (B.3)
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = Eˆpsp,K,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK), (B.4)
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK) = min
A⊆K
Eˆpsp,A,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,WK),
(B.5)
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = max
pw∈P
[N ]
W
min
ps|w∈P
[N ]
S|W
max
pxu|sw∈P
[N ]
XU|SW
(pw ps|w,Lw,Lu,D1)
Eˆpsp,K,N(R,Lw, Lu, pw, ps|w, pxu|sw,W
fair
Knom
).
(B.6)
Denote by p∗w and p∗xu|sw the maximizers in (B.6), the latter viewed as a function of ps|w. Both
maximizers depend implicitly on R, D1, and W fairKnom . Let
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
ps|w
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK) (B.7)
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = min
ps|w
Eˆpsp,N(R,Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK). (B.8)
The exponents (B.3)—(B.8) differ from (5.7)—(5.12) in that the optimizations are performed over
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conditional types instead of general conditional p.m.f.’s. We have
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) (B.9)
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,Lw, Lu,D1,WK) (B.10)
by continuity of the divergence and mutual-information functionals.
The codebook and encoding procedure are exactly as in the proof of Theorem IV, the difference being
that p∗w and p∗xu|sw are solutions to the optimization problem (B.6) instead of (A.5). The decoding rule
is the M2PMI rule of (5.2).
To analyze the error probability for this random-coding scheme, it is again sufficient to restrict our
attention to strongly-exchangeable channels and use the bound (3.2) on the conditional probability of the
collusion channel output. We also use Lemma 3.1.
(i). False Positives. By application of (5.4), a false positive occurs if Kˆ \ K 6= ∅ and
∃λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW : ∀A ⊆ Kˆ : ∃lKˆ :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ\A,mKˆ\A, λ) |s
dw)
> |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆). (B.11)
The probability of this event is upper-bounded by the probability of the larger event
∀A ⊆ Kˆ : ∃λ, lKˆ :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ\A,mKˆ\A, λ) |s
dw)
> |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆). (B.12)
Denote by p∗
s|sdw the conditional type of the host sequence and by l
∗
K the row indices selected by the
encoder. To each triple (Kˆ, λ, lKˆ), we associate a unique subset B of K ∩ Kˆ defined as follows:
• If λ 6= p∗
s|sdw then B = ∅
• If λ = p∗
s|sdw then B is the (possibly empty) set of all indices k ∈ K ∩ Kˆ such that lk = l∗k.
Thus B is the set of colluder indices k ∈ K for which the decoder correctly identifies the conditional host
sequence type p∗
s|sdw and the codewords u(l
∗
k, k, p
∗
s|sdw) that were assigned by the encoder. Denoting by
Ω(B) the set of pairs (λ, lKˆ) associated with B, we rewrite (B.12) as
∀A ⊆ Kˆ : ∃B ⊆ K ∩ Kˆ, ∃(λ, lKˆ) ∈ Ω(B) :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ\A,mKˆ\A, λ) |s
dw) > |A|(ρ(λ) +R+∆). (B.13)
Define the complement set A = Kˆ \ B which is comprised of all incorrectly accused users as well as
any colluder k such that λ 6= p∗
s|sdw or lk 6= l
∗
k. Since B ⊆ Kˆ and there is at least one innocent user
in Kˆ, the cardinality of A is at least equal to 1. By construction of the codebook and definition of A
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and B, u(lA,mA, λ) is independent of y and u(l∗B,mB, p∗s|sdw). The probability of the event (B.13) is
upper-bounded by the probability of the larger event
∃B ⊆ K, ∃λ, lA,mA :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(l
∗
B ,mB, p
∗
s|sdw) |s
dw) > |A|(ρ(λ) +R+∆). (B.14)
Hence the probability of false positives, conditioned on Ty(xu)Ksw, satisfies
PFP (Ty(xu)Ksw,WK)
= Pr

 ⋃
B⊆K
⋃
|A|≥1
{
∃λ, lA,mA :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(l
∗
B ,mB, p
∗
s|sdw) |s
dw)
> |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆)}]
≤
∑
B⊆K
∑
|A|≥1
PB,|A|(Ty(xu)Ksw,WK) (B.15)
where
PB,|A|(Ty(xu)Ksw,WK) = Pr [∃λ, lA,mA :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(l
∗
B ,mB, p
∗
s|sdw) |s
dw)
> |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆)] . (B.16)
By definition of B, there are at most
∑
λ6=ps|sdw
2N |A| ρ(λ) possible values for lA and 2N |A|R possible
values for mA in (B.16). Hence
PB,|A|(Ty(xu)Ksw,WK)
≤
∑
λ
2N |A|(R+ρ(λ)) Pr[
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(l
∗
B ,mB, p
∗
s|sdw) |s
dw) > |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆)]
(a)
.
=
∑
λ
2N |A|(R+ρ(λ)) 2−N |A| (R+∆+ρ(λ))
≤ (N + 1)|S| 2−N |A|∆
.
= 2−N |A|∆ (B.17)
where (a) is obtained by application of (C.2) with yu(l∗B,mB, p∗s|sdw) in place of z.
Combining (B.15) and (B.17) we obtain
PFP (Ty(xu)Ksw,WK) ≤
∑
B⊆K
∑
|A|≥1
2−N |A|∆
.
= 2−N∆.
Averaging over all joint type classes Ty(xu)Ksw, we obtain PFP

≤ 2−N∆, from which (5.13) follows.
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(ii). Detect-All Criterion. (Miss Some Colluders.)
Under the miss-some error event, any coalition Kˆ that contains K fails the test. By (5.4), this implies
∀λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|SdW : ∃A ⊆ Kˆ : maxlKˆ
◦
I(u(lA,mA, λ);yu(lKˆ\A,mKˆ\A, λ) |s
dw)
≤ |A| (ρ(λ) +R+∆). (B.18)
In particular, for Kˆ = K we have
∃A ⊆ K :
◦
I(u(lA,mA, ps|sdw);yu(lK\A,mK\A, ps|sdw) |s
dw) ≤ |A| (ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆). (B.19)
where lK are the row indices actually selected by the encoder, and ps|sdw is the actual host sequence
conditional type. The probability of the miss-some event, conditioned on (s,w), is therefore upper
bounded by the probability of the event (B.19):
pmiss−some(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
≤ Pr

 ⋃
A⊆K
{
◦
I(u(lA,mA, ps|sdw);yu(lK\A,mK\A, ps|sdw) |s
dw) ≤ |A|(ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆)
}
≤
∑
A⊆K
Pr
[
◦
I(u(lA,mA, ps|sdw);yu(lK\A,mK\A, ps|sdw) |s
dw) ≤ |A|(ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆)
]
(a)

≤
∑
A⊆K
exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
.
= max
A⊆K
exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
= exp2
{
−N min
A⊆K
E˘psp,A,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
(B.20)
where (a) follows from (C.5) with ν = R+∆.
Averaging over S, we obtain
pmiss−some(WK)
=
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−some(p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
(a)
.
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−N [D(ps|w‖pS | pw) + min
A⊆K
E˘psp,N(R +∆, L, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)]
}
(b)
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−NEˆpsp,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
(c)
= exp2
{
−NEpsp,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
(d).
= exp2
{
−NEpsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
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which proves (5.14). Here (a) follows from (C.3) and (B.20), (b) from the definitions (B.5) and (B.3),
(c) from (B.8), and (d) from the limit property (B.10).
(iii). Detect-One Criterion (Miss All Colluders.) Either the estimated coalition Kˆ is empty, or it is a
set I of innocent users (disjoint with K). Hence P onee ≤ Pr[Kˆ = ∅] + Pr[Kˆ = I]. The first probability,
conditioned on (sd,w), is bounded as
Pr[Kˆ = ∅] = Pr[∀K′ : M2PMI(K′) ≤ 0]
≤ Pr[M2PMI(K) ≤ 0]
= Pr[
◦
I(uK;y|s
dw) ≤ K(ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆)] (B.21)
(a)
.
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,K,N(R+∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
.
where (a) follows from (C.5) with ν = R+∆. To bound Pr[Kˆ = I], we use property (5.5) with Kˆ = I
and A = K, which yields
◦
I(uK;yuI |s
dw) ≤ K(ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆).
Since
◦
I(uK;yuI |s
dw) =
◦
I(uK;y|s
dw) + I(uK;uI |ys
dw) ≥
◦
I(uK;y|s
dw)
combining the two inequalities above yields
◦
I(uK;y|s
dw) ≤ K(ρ(ps|sdw) +R+∆).
The probability of this event is again given by (B.21); we conclude that
pmiss−all(p
∗
w ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
.
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,K,N(R +∆, Lw, Lu, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
.
Averaging over S and proceeding as in Part (ii) above, we obtain
pmiss−all(WK) ≤
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−all(p
∗
w ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
.
= exp2
{
−NEpsp(R+∆, Lw, Lu,D1,WK)
}
which establishes (5.15).
(iv). Optimal Collusion Channels are Fair. The proof parallels that of [10, Theorem 4.1(iv)] and is
omitted.
(v). Detect-All Exponent for Fair Collusion Channels. The proof parallels that of [10, Theo-
rem 4.1(v)] and is omitted.
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(vi). Achievable Rates. Consider any W = {1, · · · , Lw} and pW that is positive over its support set
(if it is not, reduce the value of Lw accordingly.) For any A ⊆ K, the divergence to be minimized in the
expression (5.7) for E˜psp,A(R,Lw, Lu, pW , p˜S|W , pXU |SW ,WK) is zero if and only if
p˜Y (XU)K|SW = p˜Y |XK p
K
XU |SW and p˜S|W = pS .
These p.m.f.’s are feasible for (5.6) if and only if the inequality below holds:
1
|A|
I(UA;Y UK\A|S
d,W ) > I(U ;S|Sd,W ) +R.
They are infeasible, and thus positive error exponents are guaranteed, if
R < min
A⊆K
1
|A|
I(UA;Y UK\A|S
d,W )− I(U ;S|Sd,W ).
From Part (iv) above, we may restrict our attention to WK = W fairK under the detect-one criterion.
Since the p.m.f. of (S,W, (XU)K, Y ) is permutation-invariant, by application of [10, Eqn. (3.3)] with
(UK, S
d) in place of (XK, S), we have
min
A⊆K
1
|A|
I(UA;Y UK\A|S
dW ) =
1
K
I(UK;Y |S
dW ). (B.22)
Hence the supremum of all R for error exponents are positive is given by Cone(D1,WK) in (5.16) and
is obtained by letting ǫ→ 0, ∆→ 0 and Lw, Lu →∞.
For any WK , under the detect-all criterion, the supremum of all R for which error exponents are positive
is given by Call(D1,WK) in (5.17) and is obtained by letting ǫ → 0, ∆ → 0 and Lw, Lu → ∞. Since
the optimal conditional p.m.f. is not necessarily permutation-invariant, (B.22) does not hold in general.
However, if WK = W fairK , (B.22) holds, and the same achievable rate is obtained for the detect-one and
detect-all problems. ✷
APPENDIX III
Lemma 3.1: 1) Fix (sd,w) and z ∈ ZN , and draw uK = {um, m ∈ K} i.i.d. uniformly over a
common type class Tu|sdw, independently of z. We have the asymptotic equality
Pr[TuK|zsdw] =
|TuK|zsdw|
|Tu|sdw|K
.
= 2−N [KH(u|s
dw)−H(uK|zsdw)] = 2−N
◦
I(uK;z|sdw) (C.1)
Pr[
◦
I(uK; z|s
dw) ≥ ν]
.
= 2−Nν . (C.2)
2) Given w, draw s i.i.d. pS . We have [21]
Pr[Ts|w]
.
= 2−ND(ps|w‖pS |pw). (C.3)
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3) Given (s,w), draw (xk,uk), k ∈ K, i.i.d. uniformly from a conditional type class Txu|sw, and then
draw Y uniformly from a single conditional type class Ty|xK . We have
Pr[Ty(xu)K|sw] =
|Ty|(xu)Ksw|
|Ty|xK |
|T(xu)K|sw|
|Txu|sw|K
.
= exp2
{
−ND(pyxK|sw‖py|xK p
K
xu|sw | psw)
}
. (C.4)
For any feasible, strongly exchangeable collusion channel, for any A ⊆ K and ν > 0, we have
Pr[
◦
I(uA;yuK\A|s
dw) ≤ |A|(ν + ρ(ps|sdw))]
.
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N(ν, L, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
xu|sw,WK)
}
. (C.5)
Proof: The derivation of (C.4), (C.3), and (C.5) parallels that of (D.12), (D.15) and (D.16) in [10].
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
Let K be size of the coalition and (fN , gN ) a sequence of length-N , rate-R randomized codes. We
show that for any sequence of such codes, reliable decoding of all K fingerprints is possible only if
R ≤ C
all
(D1,WK). Recall that the encoder generates marked copies xm = fN (s, v,m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR
and that the decoder outputs an estimated coalition gN (y, sd, v) ∈ {1, · · · , 2NR}⋆. We use the notation
MK , {M1, · · · ,MK} and XK , {X1, · · · ,XK}.
To prove that Call(D1,WK) is an upper bound on capacity, it suffices to identify a family of collusion
channels for which reliable decoding is impossible at rates above Call(D1,WK). As shown in [10], it is
sufficient to derive such a bound for the compound family WK of memoryless channels.
Our derivation is an extension of the single-user compound Gel’fand-Pinsker problem [11] to the
multiple-access case. A lower bound on error probability is obtained when an oracle informs the decoder
that the coalition size is at most K.
There are

 2NR
K

 ≤ 2KNR possible coalitions of size ≤ K. We represent such a coalition as
MK , {M1, · · · ,MK}, where Mk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are drawn i.i.d. uniformly from {1, · · · , 2NR}.
Given a memoryless channel pY |XK ∈ WK , the joint p.m.f. of (MK , V,S,XK ,Y) is given by
pMKV SXKY = p
N
S pV
∏
1≤k≤K
(
pMk 1{Xk=fN (S,V,Mk)}
)
pNY |XK . (D.1)
Our derivations make repeated use of the identity
I(UA;Y |Z,UK\A)− I(UA;S|Z,UK\A) = I(UA;Y,Z|UK\A)− I(UA;S,Z|UK\A)
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which follows from the chain rule for conditional mutual information and holds for any (UK, S, Y, Z).
The total error probability (including false positives and false negatives) for the detect-all decoder is
Pe(pY |XK ) = Pr[Kˆ 6= K] (D.2)
when collusion channel pY |XK ∈ WK is in effect.
Step 1. Following the derivation of [10, Eqn. (B.20)] with (Y,Sd, V ) in place of (Y,S, V ) at the
receiver, for the error probability Pe(pY |XK ) to vanish for each pY |XK ∈ WK , we need
R ≤ lim inf
N→∞
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
N |A|
I(MA;Y|S
d, V ). (D.3)
Step 2. Define the i.i.d. random variables
Wi = {V, Sj , j 6= i} ∈ VN × S
N−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (D.4)
Also define the random variables
Vki = (Mk, V, S
N
i+1),
Uki = (Vki, (Y S
d)i−1) = (Mk, V, S
N
i+1, (Y S
d)i−1), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (D.5)
where SNi+1 , (Si+1, · · · , SN ) and (Y Sd)i−1 , (Y1, Sd1 , · · · , Yi−1, Sdi−1). Hence
V Ki−1 = (V
K
i , Si), V
K
1 = U
K
1 , V
K
N = (M
K , V ). (D.6)
The following properties hold for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
• By (D.1) and (D.5), (Si,Wi, UKi ) = (MK , V,S, Y i−1)→ XKi → Yi forms a Markov chain.
• The random variables Xki, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are conditionally i.i.d. given (S, V ) = (Si,Wi).
• Due to the term Y i−1 in (D.5), the random variables Uki, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are conditionally dependent
given (S, V ) = (Si,Wi).
The joint p.m.f. of (Si,Wi,XKi , UKi , Yi) may thus be written as
pSipWi

 ∏
1≤k≤K
pXki|SiWi

 pUKi |XKi SiWi pY |XK, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (D.7)
Step 3. Consider a time-sharing random variable T that is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , N} and in-
dependent of the other random variables, and define the tuple of random variables (S, Sd,W,UK ,XK , Y )
as (ST , S
d
T ,WT , U
K
T ,X
K
T , YT ). Also let W = (WT , T ) and Uk = (Uk,T , T ), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, which are
defined over alphabets of respective cardinalities
Lw(N) = N |VN | |S|
N−1
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and
Lu(N) = N |VN | 2
N [R+logmax(|S|,|Y| |Sd|)].
Since (Si,Wi, UKi )→ XKi → Yi forms a Markov chain, so does (S,W,UK)→ XK → Y . From (D.7),
the joint p.m.f. of (S,W,UK ,XK , Y ) takes the form
pSpW

 ∏
1≤k≤K
pXk|SW

 pUK |XKSW pY |XK . (D.8)
In (6.1) we have defined the set
P
outer
XKUKW |S(pS , Lw, Lu,D1) =
{
pXKUKW |S = pW
(
K∏
k=1
pXk|SW
)
pUK |XKSW
: pX1|SW = · · · = pXK |SW , and Ed(S,X1) ≤ D1
} (D.9)
where |W| = Lw and |U| = Lu. Observe that pXKUKW |S defined in (D.8) belongs to PXKUKW |S(pS , Lw,
Lu,D1).
Define the collection of K indices K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} and the following functionals indexed by A ⊆ K:
JLw ,Lu,A(pS , pXKUKW |S, pY |XK ) =
1
|A|
[I(UA;Y S
d|UK\A)− I(UA;S|UK\A)]. (D.10)
Step 4. We have
I(MK;Y|S
d, V )
(a)
= I(MK;Y|S
d, V )− I(MK, V ;S|S
d)
= I(MK, V ;Y|S
d)− I(V ;Y|Sd)− I(MK, V ;S|S
d)
≤ I(MK, V ;Y|S
d)− I(MK, V ;S|S
d)
(b)
= I(MK, V ;YS
d)− I(MK, V ;S)
(c)
≤
N∑
i=1
[I(UK,i;YiS
d
i )− I(UK,i;Si)]
= I(UK,T ;Y S
d|T )− I(UK,T ;S|T )
= I(UK,T , T ;Y S
d)− I(T ;Y Sd)− I(UK,T , T ;S) + I(T ;S)
(d)
≤ I(UK,T , T ;Y S
d)− I(UK,T , T ;S)
(e)
= I(UK;Y S
d)− I(UK;S)
= K JLw(N),Lu(N),K(pS , pXKUKW |S, pY |XK ), (D.11)
where (a) holds because MK , V,S are mutually independent, and (b) follows from the chain rule for
mutual information, (c) from [20, Lemma 4], using V Ki and UKi in place of Vi and Ui, respectively, (d)
holds because I(T ;S) = 0, and (e) by definition of UK.
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For all A ⊂ K, we have
I(MA;Y|S
d, V ) = I(MA, V ;Y|S
d, V )
(a)
= I(MA, V ;Y|S
d, V )− I(MA, V ;S|S
d,MK\A, V )
(b)
= I(MA, V ;Y|S
d,MK\A, V )− I(MA, V ;S|S
d,MK\A)
= I(MA, V ;YS
d|MK\A, V )− I(MA, V ;S|S
d,MK\A, V )
(c)
=
N∑
i=1
[I(UA,i;YiS
d
i |UK\A,i)− I(UA,i;Si|UK\A,i)] (D.12)
= N [I(UA,T ;Y S
d|UK\A,T , T )− I(UA,T ;S|UK\A,T , T )]
= N [I(UA,T , T ;Y S
d|UK\A,T , T )− I(UA,T , T ;S|UK\A,T , T )]
(d)
= N [I(UA;Y S
d|UK\A)− I(UA;S|UK\A)]
= N |A|JLw(N),Lu(N),A(pS , pXKUKW |S, pY |XK ). (D.13)
where (a) and (b) hold because MK , S, and V are mutually independent, the equality (c) is proved at
the end of this section, and (d) follows from the definition of UK.
Combining (D.3), (D.11), and (D.13), we obtain
R ≤ lim inf
N→∞
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
JLw(N),Lu(N),A(pS, pXKUKW |S, pY |XK )
(a)
≤ sup
Lw,Lu
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
JLw ,Lu,A(pS, pXKUKW |S, pY |XK )
≤ sup
Lw,Lu
max
pXKUKW |S∈PXKUKW |S(pS ,Lw,Lu,D1)
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
JLw,Lu,A(pS , pXKUKW |S, pY |XK )
(b)
= sup
Lw,Lu
C
all
Lw,Lu
(D1,WK)
= lim
Lw,Lu→∞
C
all
Lw,Lu
(D1,WK)
(c)
= C
all
(D1,WK), (D.14)
where (a) holds because the functionals JLw ,Lu,A(·) are nondecreasing in Lw, Lu, (b) uses the definition
of CallLw,Lu in (6.2), and (c) the fact that the sequence {C
all
Lw,Lu
} is nondecreasing.
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Proof of (D.12). Recall the definitions of VK,i = (MK, V, SNi+1) and UK,i = (VK,i, (Y Sd)i−1) in (D.5)
and the recursion (D.6) for VK,i. We prove the following inequality:
I(UA,i;YiS
d
i |UK\A,i)− I(UA,i;Si|UK\A,i)
= [I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i|VK\A,i)− I(VA,i;S
i|VK\A,i)]
−[I(VA,i−1; (Y S
d)i−1|VK\A,i−1)− I(VA,i−1;S
i−1|VK\A,i−1)]. (D.15)
Then summing both sides of this equality from i = 2 to N , cancelling terms, and using the properties
Vk,1 = Uk,1 and Vk,N = (Mk, V ) yields (D.12).
The first of the six terms in (D.15) may be expanded as follows:
I(UA,i;YiS
d
i |UK\A,i) = I(VA,i, (Y S
d)i−1;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i, (Y S
d)i−1)
= I(VA,i;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i, (Y S
d)i−1)
= I(VA,i, (Y S
d)i−1;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i)− I((Y S
d)i−1;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i)
= I(UA,i;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i)− I((Y S
d)i−1;YiS
d
i |VK\A,i). (D.16)
Similarly for the second term, replacing (Y Sd) with S in the above derivation, we obtain
I(UA,i;Si|UK\A,i) = I(UA,i;Si|VK\A,i)− I((Y S
d)i−1;Si|VK\A,i). (D.17)
The six terms in (D.15) can be expanded using the chain rule for mutual information, in the same way
as in [20, Lemma 4.2]:
I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i|VK\A,i) = I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i−1|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i|VK\A,i) (D.18)
I(VA,i;S
i|VK\A,i) = I(VA,i;S
i−1|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i;Si|VK\A,i) (D.19)
I(VA,i−1;S
i−1|VK\A,i−1) = I(VA,i;S
i−1|Si, VK\A,i−1) (D.20)
I(VA,i−1; (Y S
d)i−1|VK\A,i−1) = I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i−1|Si, VK\A,i−1) (D.21)
I(UA,i;Si|VK\A,i) = I((Y S
d)i−1;Si|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i;Si|(Y S
d)i−1, VK\A,i) (D.22)
I(UA,i; (Y S
d)i|VK\A,i) = I((Y S
d)i−1; (Y Sd)i|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i|(Y S
d)i−1, VK\A,i).
(D.23)
Moreover, expanding the conditional mutual information I(VA,i;Si, (Y Sd)i−1|VK\A,i) in two different
ways, we obtain
I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i−1|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i;Si|(Y S
d)i−1, VK\A,i)
= I(VA,i;S
i−1|VK\A,i) + I(VA,i; (Y S
d)i−1|Si, VK\A,i). (D.24)
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Substracting the sum of (D.17), (D.18), (D.20), (D.22), (D.24) from the sum of (D.16), (D.19), (D.21),
(D.23), and cancelling terms, we obtain (D.15), from which the claim follows. ✷
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